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capacity as sole owner, the policies of the privilege should take
precedence over incidental difficulties in regulation.o
Wild's claim of self incrimination is the type which the fifth
amendment should protect. The Wilson and Grant decisions do
not compel the "mechanical" rejection of Wild's constitutional
privilege merely because of incorporation. Since Wild's claim fits
the spirit and policy of the privilege, he should not be compelled
to give up the records, whether he or his corporation is being
investigated, if they tend to incriminate him.
Administrative Law-Criminal Law-Inspections
Without a Warrant Made Under Public Health,
Safety, and Welfare Laws Held Unconstitutional
for Purpose of Criminal Prosecutions
Defendant had been convicted of violating a zoning ordinance
of the village of Laurel Hollow, New York, which made it a crime
to conduct a business in a nonbusiness zone.- Building inspectors
had entered defendant's premises, over his objections, under
authority of section 10.1 of the village Building Zone Ordinance,
which authorized the building inspector "to enter any building or
premises at any reasonable hour." Evidence was thereby obtained
that defendant was using his mansion, in a residential area, for
the business of design and fabrication of furniture, fabrics, wall
coverings, and similar materials. On appeal the New York Court
of Appeals, by a divided court, reversed and held that a search
by public officials without a warrant was unconstitutional when
done for the purpose of obtaining criminal prosecutions. People v.
Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304, 200 N.E.2d 441,251 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1964).
The leading case on administrative search is Frank v. Maryland,' in which the United States Supreme Court held, by a
divided court, that the power of health inspectors to search did
not depend upon a search warrant.' In Frank, a city health in40. A test to determine which types of corporations are such that the
custodian should be permitted to claim his personal privilege as to the documents is difficult to state with precision. Perhaps the White test, now used
for unincorporated associations, is a start. See note 36 supra.
1. Laurel Hollow, N.Y., Building Zone Ordinance art. x, §§ 50, 10.2, referred to in the instant case.
2. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
3. A number of earlier state cases, not relied on in Frank,allowed health
and safety inspections of public or quasi-public places without warrants. Hubbell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa 36, 126 N.W. 914 (1910) (hotel); Keiper v. City of
Louisville, 152 Ky. 691, 154 S.W. 18 (1913); City of St. Louis v. Evans, 337
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spector, having reasonable grounds to believe that a house was rat
infested, demanded entry.4 The homeowner refused and was
subsequently convicted under an ordinance imposing a 20 dollar
fine for refusing entry." The Court held that imposing a duty on
homeowners to allow inspections without a warrant by health
officials was a reasonable infringement of privacy rights" and did
not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.7
In allowing inspection without a warrant, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority in Frank, distinguished the administrative inspection from the search for criminal evidence.
"Inspection" is designed to determine whether conditions exist
that are proscribed by health and safety laws so that civil proceedings of notice and orders to remedy the improper conditions can
be instituted." "Searches" are designed to produce evidence to be
used in criminal prosecutions. The appellant in Frank had argued
S.W.2d 948 (Mo. 1960) (rooming house); Dederick v. Smith, 88 N.H. 63, 184
Atl. 595 (1936), appeal dismissed, 299 U.S. 506 (1936) (barns); State v. Normand, 76 N.H. 541, 85 Atl. 899 (1913); Reinhart v. State, 193 Tenn. 15, 241
S.W.2d 854 (1951) (hospital); Mazanec v. Flannery, 176 Tenn. 125, 138 S.W.2d
441 (1940) (strawberry packing plant). Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 14
A.2d 764 (1956), allowed routine inspections of private dwellings at reasonable
hours without a warrant.
In District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on
other grounds,339 U.S. 1 (1950), the Court of Appeals held that health inspectors needed warrants, and the Supreme Court affirmed on another ground of
statutory interpretation, expressly stating and avoiding the constitutional
problem. The Frank Court did not follow the reasoning of the Court of Appeals
in Little.
Finally, in St. Louis v. Claspil, City Court of St. Louis, First Division, April
29, 1959 (unreported), an inspection was held unreasonable when done at night,
under no emergency, for enforcement of a minor violation. See 14 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 473, 476 (1960).
4. Following a complaint of rats in the neighborhood, a health inspector
found a pile of rat feces outside defendant's home. 359 U.S. at 361.
5. BALTmIORE, MD., CITY Con art. 12, § 120 (1950):
Whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect that
a nuisance exists in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may demand entry
therein in the day time, and if the owner or occupier shall refuse or
delay to open the same and admit a free examination, he shall forfeit
and pay for every such refusal the sum of Twenty Dollars.
Quoted in 359 U.S. at 361.
6. 359 U.S. at 367.
Following Frank, a conviction -for violation of a similar ordinance that
authorized health inspection at any reasonable hour, without the requirement
of reasonable grounds, was affirmed by an equally divided Court in Ohio ex rel.
Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
7. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall ... deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .
8. 359 U.S. at 362, 366.
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that whether or not the fourth amendment 9 prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures applied directly to the states,
under Wolf v. Colorado"o the core of that amendment - "the
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion . . ."" -

ap-

plied to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 2 Frankfurter argued that historically the
fourth amendment was primarily intended to protect citizens from
searches for criminal evidence, and that the due process clause,
incorporating the core of that amendment, was therefore also
primarily concerned with criminal, not "civil,"'3 searches. 4 In the
criminal area a search, to be "reasonable," must be carried out
under a warrant, incident to a valid arrest, or under unusual
circumstances of necessity. 3 Distinguishing administrative inspection from searches for criminal evidence avoids the rigid safeguards in the criminal area and facilitates the use of inspection to
maintain community health.' By finding the fourth amendment
inapplicable, Frankfurter was able to treat the problem of the
warrantless inspection purely in fourteenth amendment terms. 7
Balancing the interests of the community in maintaining health
and safety standards against the interest of the individual in
privacy of the home, Frankfurter found the public interest to outweigh the slight encroachment on privacy produced by civil administrative inspection'8 and thus found no denial of due process.
9. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
10. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
11. Id. 27-28.
12. Brief for Appellant, p. 9, Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
13. Administrative inspections can be called "civil" searches because they
are part of a civil administrative process as opposed to the criminal process.
14. 359 U.S. at 365. However, Mr. Justice Douglas disagreed with Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's interpretation of history. Douglas argued that the fourth amendment primarily protects privacy rights, and therefore its protection is not
limited to criminal prosecutions in connection with the more explicit safeguards
against self incrimination of the fifth amendment, but can stand alone to
prohibit invasion of the home by government officials. Id. at 376-82 (dissenting
opinion).
15. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948);
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
16. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 372 (1959).
17. See 59 Micia. L. REv. 447, 448 (1961); 108 U. PA. L. REV. 265, 270-71

(1959).
18. 359 U.S. at 372.
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The Laverne case treats a different type of administrative
search than that approved in Frank; that is, an administrative
search to obtain evidence for criminal prosecutions. Because of its
purpose, the inspection could not be considered merely as part
of administrative or civil proceedings. There being no showing
of special circumstances, the New York court held the inspection
to be unreasonable and excluded the evidence so obtained." The
court did not consider whether New York standards were more
stringent than federal standards of reasonableness2 0 and did not
consider whether the privacy guarantees of the fourth and fourteenth amendments, or of the state constitution,2 1 were limited
to criminal situations; but once having found a criminal situation
it assumed that the inspection was unconstitutional when done
without a warrant.
Laverne differs from Frank in that here the inspection ordinance apparently authorized forced entry, while the ordinance in
Frank penalized the homeowner if he refused entry2 2 but did not
authorize forced entry?3 In the instant case the criminal sanctions
of the zoning ordinance operated immediately, while in Frank the
procedure for enforcing the health regulations was a civil order
to abate the nuisance that the inspection uncovered.2 ' Both ordinances were civil in subject matter - regulations of public
19. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), held that the fourth
amendment barred the use of evidence secured through illegal search and
seizure in a federal prosecution. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), held
that although the core of the fourth amendment applied to the states through
the fourteenth amendment, the exclusionary rule was not binding. Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) held that the exclusionary rule also applied to the
states.
Evidence consisting of testimony concerning objects observed by officials
while illegally searching is treated the same as evidence of physical objects
illegally seized. Williams v. United States, 263 F.2d 487, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1959);
McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598, 603 (1st Cir. 1955). This position
has been adopted by the New York courts. People v. O'Neill, 11 N.Y.2d 148,
158--54, 182 N.E.2d 95, 98, 227 N.Y.S.2d 416, 420 (1962).
20. Although a state may require higher standards of reasonableness for
searches and seizures than does the federal constitution, New York apparently
does not. People v. Ward, 32 Mise. 2d 843, 223 N.Y.S.2d 355 (County Ct.
1962); see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963).
21. The search and seizure provisions of the New York Constitution and
the fourth amendment are identically worded. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
22. The ordinance in the instant case authorized the inspector "to enter."
In Frank the ordinance was worded "he may demand entry." See note 5 srupra.
23. 359 U.S. at 367.
24. Brief for Appellee, pp. 22-23, Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
25. Zoning ordinances, as well as health ordinances, are valid exercises
of the state police power in regulating public health, safety, and welfare. E.g.,
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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health, safety, and welfare without requiring scienter" but in the instant case the process of immediate enforcement of
community standards was not the civil process as in Frank, but
the criminal process. Distinguishing civil inspections from criminal searches on the basis of the resultant sanction presents difficulties because all regulations must ultimately depend upon criminal sanctions for enforcement. Frankfurter did not demand
criminal safeguards in administrative inspections because the
inspection did not bring about criminal penalties. However, if the
civil procedures fail to accomplish correction of substandard conditions, the reasoning of the New York court seems to indicate
that the evidence obtained by the inspection would be excluded
in a resort to criminal prosecution. Thus, the civil-criminal distinction breaks down if the homeowner refuses to obey a civil
order based on the administrative search.2 7
In searches for criminal evidence, requiring a warrant protects
the individual citizen from arbitrary police intrusions. However,
enforcement of public welfare regulations depends upon inspection
to determine whether or not substandard conditions requiring
correction exist. Normally the dangers of health, safety, and welfare defects are hidden or realized only by the expert eye.2 8 Thus
it is necessary and reasonable for the community to authorize administrative inspection without a warrant in order to determine
whether any dangerous conditions are present. But the civil-crim26. Regulations in the noncriminal fields of pure food, traffic, building,
labor and wages might be labeled criminal, but these statutory crimes are "in
reality an attempt to utilize ... criminal administration as an enforcing arm
for social regulations of a purely civil nature, with the punishment totally
unrelated to questions of moral wrongdoing or guilt." Commonwealth v.
Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 580, 155 A.2d 825, 827-28 (1959); of. Brief for Appellee, p. 25, Frank v. Maryland, 859 U.S. 360 (1959). These public welfare
offenses impair "the efficiency of controls deemed essential to the social order
. . ." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952). Thus, unlike true
crimes, violations of public welfare statutes do not require scienter, except
perhaps in the obscenity area where there is a conflict with the free speech
and press guarantees of the first amendment. See Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147, 152 (1959); Id. at 162 (concurring opinion).
27. Mr. Justice Douglas suggested that a "probable cause" test for issuance of an administrative inspection warrant could take into account the
nature of civil inspections, and that the mere lapse of time might be reason
enough to allow periodic inspection. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383
(dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Frankfurter counters that this would be a
mere "synthetic search warrant" having the same effect as not requiring a
warrant at all. See Id. at 373. It would seem that requiring such a weak
warrant would simply unduly complicate the administrative process. See 108
U. PA. L. REv. 265, 276-78 (1959).
28. See id. at 274.
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inal distinction of Frank does not solve community enforcement
problems. Perhaps a more profitable analysis would be from the
subject matter point of view. Reasonable warrantless inspections
to enforce public welfare regulations could be permitted. Whether
the criminal process was immediately used - though a factor need not be controlling. Considerations in determining whether
the ordinance authorizing inspection was reasonable could be
time of day, authority given inspectors, and harshness of penalties
for either violation of inspection regulations or violations of the
welfare regulations themselves?" As to the inspection itself, notice
and reasonableness in its execution should be required to protect
the individual's interests.so Individual protections would come
from safeguards during prosecutions for violations, such as excluding evidence obtained unreasonably, and in allowing or providing
remedies against offending officials, such as a civil suit or criminal
prosecution.3
Although the problems discussed above were raised by the
Laverne case and the court's approach to zoning inspection, they
were not, and did not need to be, solved. Violation of a zoning
ordinance can normally be proved without resort to inspection
much more readily than the hidden violations of health or safety
regulations. The defendant's corporation had previously been enjoined from carrying on the activities complained of here. 3 2 Thus,
it would seem that there was no need for forced entry, since a
warrant could have been obtained on the basis of observations
from without defendant's home. Although reaching a proper
result by following the Frank analysis, the court restricted the
use of administrative searches to enforce public welfare provisions.
These restrictions seem to be neither necessary nor desirable.
29. See Comment, 44 MiNt. L. REV. 513, 519-20 n.a4 (1960); Comment,
5 S.D. L. REV. 40, 56 (1960); 1959 U. Irm. LF. 661, 662.
30. See 108 U. PA. L. REV. 265, 276 (1959).
31. The problem with civil suits is that it would be difficult for the
homeowner to show any real damage, and the offending official may well be
unable to satisfy a substantial judgment against him. A number of states
provide criminal penalties in the form of fines against officials who overstep
their authority in search and seizure, but these provisions afford no relief to
the homeowner. See the statutes referred to in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
652 n.7 (1961).
32. Incorporated Village of Laurel Hollow v. Laverne Originals, Inc., 283
App. Div. 795, 128 N.Y.S.2d 326, af'd, 307 N.Y. 784, 121 N.E.2d 618 (1954).

